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Abstract 
The common agricultural policy (CAP) has been stated as one of the most important 
policies within the European Union (EU), and is the fundament for agricultural 
development in the member states. However, the CAP has been stated to effect 
biodiversity in a negative way. To handle the decreasing biodiversity in agricultural 
landscapes within the EU, the CAP has been developed to include measures to 
maintain biodiversity in agricultural landscapes, two of them being the mandatory 
“Ecological Focus Areas” (EFA) and the voluntary Agri-Environmental Schemes 
(AES). In this study, I investigate the differences in farmers’ preferences towards 
these different measures, and how collaboration between farmers could be increased. 
The results are obtained through a systematised literature review. One reason for 
farmers having a negative preference towards collaboration regarding environmental 
measures could be the risk of lost farmland productivity, which could have an even 
more negative effect if there is a high probability of farm-takeover. Collaboration 
between farmers regarding AES could be increased by actively offer information on 
why collaboration could increase farm productivity, as well as giving information on 
why this could lead to increased biodiversity. Even if economical determinants have 
a great impact on farmers’ preferences towards, other determinants such as 
administrative restrictions and farmers’ perceptions and knowledge play a crucial role 
when explaining farmers’ preferences towards both AES and EFA. Generally, 
farmers are most willing to take on environmental measures that are easily 
implemented and cheap to maintain. This means that when developing agri-
environmental policies, policy makers must take a holistic approach to design a 
policy that motivates farmers to choose measures with high environmental impact.  
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Introduction 
The common agricultural policy (CAP) has been stated as one of the most important 
policies within the European Union (EU), and is the fundament for agricultural 
development in the member states (Leventon et al. 2017). However, the CAP has 
been stated to effect biodiversity in a negative way (Wretenberg et al. 2007).  There 
are studies showing that when the CAP is applied to agricultural landscapes, the 
diversity of bird species decrease, compared to when the agricultural land was less 
intensive, or compared to countries outside of the EU (Donald et al. 2002; 
Wretenberg et al. 2007). The reason behind this pattern has been explained by 
Donald et al. (2002) as the CAP being focused on productivity and thus increasing 
farming intensity also in less intensive farming areas.  
To handle the decreasing biodiversity in agricultural landscapes within the EU, 
the CAP has been developed to include methods to maintain biodiversity in 
agricultural landscapes, starting with the reform of the policy in 2003 and increasing 
in the 2013 reform (Hauck et al., 2014). There are different agri-environmental 
measures in the CAP to promote biodiversity, two of them being farmers’ 
participation in voluntary agri-environmental schemes (AES), regulated in the Rural 
Development Programmes under pillar 2 (Regulation [EU] No. 1305, 2013), and the 
mandatory greening measures that are part of the direct payments under pillar 1 
(Regulation [EU] No 1307, 2013). The mandatory greening measures include that 
farmers must leave 5% of their land as Ecological Focus Areas (EFA). However, 
there is a suggestion from the Commission to increase the limit from 5 % to 7% 
(Regulation [EU] No 1307, 2013). 
Although one of the purposes of environmental measures is to increase and 
maintain biodiversity in agricultural landscapes, the actual effects on biodiversity are 
still widely debated. The common conclusion is that there are some benefits on 
biodiversity, although the overall effectiveness of the measures could be improved 
(Batáry et al., 2015; Pe’er et al., 2014). Although this has been argued since the 2003 
reform (Kleijn & Sutherland, 2003), the CAP reforms so far have not lead to an 
increased the effectiveness of the measures regarding biodiversity (Pe’er et al. 2014; 
Batáry et al. 2015). Due to failures in policy design and implementation, the 
biodiversity still decreases today, although for some taxa at a lower rate as one decay 
ago (Pe’er et al. 2014). 
There are many reasons on why the CAP fails on increasing biodiversity, one of 
them being the low commitment from farmers regarding voluntary agri-
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environmental measures (Hauck et al. 2014). Research investigating solutions for this 
failure often brings up possible improvements when revising the CAP and its agri-
environmental measures, making it easier or more attractive for farmers to adopt the 
measures (Villanueva et al. 2015a; Villanueva et al. 2015b). An example of such an 
improvement is to increase the administrative support and ecological advice, as 
suggested by Pe’er et al. (2016). Another reason is that the measures fail to reach the 
ecological issues they are designed to improve due to unsuitable management or 
implementation of the measures from an ecological point of view (Pe’er et al. 2016). 
For example, among the EFAs that Member States can choose to implement are 
land lying fallow, landscape features, buffer strips, agroforestry, short rotation 
coppice and afforested areas (Regulation [EU] No 1307, 2013). For some of these 
measures, such as buffer strips, fallow land and landscape features, studies have 
shown positive impacts on biodiversity (Pe’er et al. 2016). Therefore, the effect on 
biodiversity can vary depending on which EFAs the Member States decides to 
implement, the effect on biodiversity can vary (Pe’er et al. 2016). The effect on 
biodiversity can also vary depending on how farmers decide to implement them. For 
example, buffer strips could be more or less beneficial for biodiversity depending on 
the flora sown in the buffer strips (Mante & Gerowitt 2009). 
Additionally, researchers often bring up the possibility for collaboration 
between farmers as one possible way to increase the effectiveness of environmental 
measures for biodiversity (McKenzie et al., 2013; Kuhfuss et al., 2016). This 
approach is based on the need for a landscape scale management in biodiversity 
conservation. The reason why landscape scale management is needed is because it 
would increase patch sizes managed by AES, as well as creating a heterogeneity in 
the farmland landscape (Leventon et al. 2017) This landscape perspective might not 
be possible to accomplish unless neighbouring farmers collaborate to allocate areas 
and manage habitats to create a heterogeneous landscape mosaic (Ekroos et al. 
2016). However, the majority of the studies upon collective participation in 
agricultural management is based on results from countries outside of the EU 
(Siebert et al. 2006). Within the EU, the Netherlands is the only country having a 
longer experience of collective participation in agri-environmental measures (Siebert 
et al. 2006).  
There are also studies showing that the willingness to accept and adopt 
environmental measures amongst farmers increases with a higher level of education 
and knowledge in sustainable agriculture (Villanueva et al., 2017). If the willingness 
to accept and adopt environmental measures increases, combined with an improved 
policy design and implementation, the overall effect of the measures on biodiversity 
might increase with it. This could have a variety of explanations, one of them being 
that if an increased area of agricultural land would be enrolled in the measures; this 
could increase the probability to reach up to the ecological thresholds in habitat size 
and connectivity needed for increased biodiversity (Pe’er et al. 2016; Pe’er et al. 
2014).  
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A clear and wider perspective of the different reasons and solutions to why the 
measures still fails to improve biodiversity in agricultural landscapes is needed. This 
study aims to summarise and compare farmers’ preferences towards mandatory and 
voluntary environmental measures, with focus on how collaboration between 
farmers regarding both voluntary and mandatory environmental measures could 
increase the positive effect on biodiversity. I aim to bring together results from 
current studies in a literature review. The study is meant to explain farmers’ 
preferences towards relevant measures within the EU. I therefore excluded studies 
done outside of the EU, where conditions for farming and general livelihood could 
be expected to differ. Additionally, the study will focus on possible solutions to the 
stated results, focusing on collaboration and increased knowledge amongst farmers, 
and how the policy design could be developed and improved. The results and 
suggestions presented in this study could be used by policy makers and politicians 
when evaluating the process in which environmental measures are implemented in 
member states of the EU. 
Questions that will be answered in this study include: 
• Since collaboration between farmers regarding environmental measures 
could increase biodiversity, how could collaboration be increased? 
• Should the suggested approach differ between mandatory and 
voluntary environmental measures amongst farmers? 
• Depending on where the obstacles for farmers are to enrol in and 
collaborate around environmental measures, how could the policy 
design be developed and improved to facilitate for farmers to do so?  
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Method 
In order to answer the questions assessed above, I have conducted a systematised 
literature review (Haddaway et al. 2015). To compose relevant search phrases, a 
general literature review was conducted during the initial scoping phase. From these 
articles a wide spectrum of relevant words and search phrases were suggested. These 
were then tested for relevance in additional searches in databases such as Scopus and 
Web of Science. The final search phrases, which can be seen in table 1, were used in 
Web of Science (core collection), Scopus and LUBsearch. The search for literature 
was conducted between April 15th and May 2nd, 2017 and resulted in 161 individual 
research articles. 
Table 1 Search phrases and number of results 
Results from the final search phrases when used in Scopus, Web of Science (core collection) and 
LUBsearch. *=When ”Agri-environmental schemes” AND incentiv*” was used in LUBsearch, the 
results were sorted after the field ”agri-environmental schemes” and as peer reviewed only, to increase 
the initial relevance. Duplicates are not removed in these results. 
Search phrase Scopus Web of Science 
(core collection) 
LUBsearch 
”Ecological focus areas” AND collective 3 2 3 
”Ecological focus areas” AND preference* 6 4 7 
”Ecological focus areas” AND incentiv* 6 1 3 
”Agri-environmental measures” AND preference* 10 13 18 
”Agri-environmental measures” AND collective 2 2 3 
”Agri-environmental measures” AND incentiv* 18 17 24 
”Agri-environmental schemes” AND preference* 33 46 46 
”Agri-environmental schemes” AND collective 12 12 12 
”Agri-environmental schemes” AND incentiv* 39 48 27* 
”Common agricultural policy” AND greening AND 
incentiv* 
4 4 3 
 
To decide whether or not the individual papers found during the literature search 
were relevant enough to be included in my study, I assessed the collected literature 
from the final searches at progressively greater levels of detail, as suggested by 
Haddaway et al. (2015). The literature has initially been assessed based on the title. 
After this step, 61 of the originally found articles were still included. In the next step, 
the articles were assessed and ranked based on their abstract. Each article was given a 
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grade from a 1-3 scale, based on the level of relevance and their ability to answer my 
study questions (table 2). The grading system was based on the following criteria: 
• Does the literature cover collaboration between farmers regarding 
AEM?  
• Does the literature show preferences amongst farmers regarding AEM? 
• Does the literature give examples of incentives for farmers to join 
AEM? 
• Does the literature discuss how policy development and 
implementation could benefit for farmers to join AEM? 
Table 2 Articles sorted after relevance 
The total number of articles, with duplicates both included and removed, and the number of articles 
graded based on their relevance. Relevant articles, which was 61 articles, are those who were left after 
the total number of articles with duplicates removed (161), were sorted between either relevant or 
irrelevant articles. 
Assessment Number of articles 
Total number of articles (duplicates included) 428 
Total number of articles (duplicates removed) 161 
Relevant articles 61 
Relevance ”3” 31 
Relevance ”2” 23 
Relevance ”1” 6 
 
For the literature to be given the highest priority “3”, the literature had to be focused 
on either one of these criteria fully, or parts of several of them. For example, an 
article could be given 3 if it focuses solemnly on collaboration between farmers 
regarding AEM, or if it partly focuses on collaboration and farmers’ preferences 
regarding AEM. The middle priority “2” was given if the literature covered at least 
one of the criteria stated above, but not with the exact focus aimed for in this study. 
For example, this could be an article about farmers’ preferences regarding AEM, but 
described by policy makers instead from the farmers’ perspective. The lowest 
priority, “1”, was given to articles that had in principal the right focus, for example 
regarding farmers’ preferences or collaboration between farmers, but with an 
approach that made it irrelevant for this study. For example, this could be if the 
study was based on results from outside of the EU.  
Once the literature has been sorted and graded after relevance, the articles with 
the highest priority (3) were taken out and included in the results.  
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Results 
The overall trend within the literature found is that there is a great value in 
understanding farmers’ preferences when designing agri-environmental measures and 
developing the common agricultural policy. Unfortunately, there is a clear difference 
between the amount of research made on the agri-environmental measures focused 
on in this study; ecological focus areas (EFA) and agri-environmental schemes 
(AES). Farmers’ preferences towards AES regarding both individual and collective 
contracts have been widely investigated, however, the same attributes towards EFA 
has not yet been examined to the same extent (table 3).  
Farmers’ perceptions and preferences can be categorised in different ways. In 
this study, I use a concept presented by Pe’er et al. (2016) based on the three 
different determinants explaining farmers’ preferences regarding ecological focus 
areas (EFA); “economical determinants”, “administrative restrictions” and “farmers’ 
perception and knowledge”. Under each of these categories, I will present findings 
regarding the different types of environmental measures separately. To include the 
collective aspect, the payments will then be separately presented regarding “collective 
participation”. Within each section, the determinants will initially be explained for 
voluntary measures (AES), and then for mandatory measures (EFA). 
Table 3 Articles focus area/areas 
The number of articles with focus on ”agri-environmental schemes”, ”ecological focus areas”, 
”collective AES” and ”collective EFA”, respectively. Note that some articles focus on many areas, such 
as both AES and EFA, which explains the increased total number of articles. 
Topic Number of articles 
Agri-environmental schemes 31 
Ecological focus areas 5 
Collective AES 12 
Collective EFA 1 
Total number of articles considered 31 
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Economical determinants 
Voluntary measures 
The adoption of AES primary depends on the economical compensation received, 
rather than other motives such as administrative restrictions or farmers’ perception 
and knowledge (Josefsson et al. 2017). This is supported by results presented by 
Franzén et al. (2016), explaining that high costs are the main reason for not wanting 
to enrol AES on wetland creation in the agricultural landscape surrounding 
Stockholm, Sweden. Villanueva et al. (2015b) has showed similar results, where 
farmers show a high interest in the economical compensation that AES enrolment 
implies. Also, farmers who receive high direct payments are less willing to enrol AES 
(Villanueva et al. 2015b). It is also shown that farmers would be more positive 
towards AES if they received compensation for the implementation of the measures 
before the implementation started (Lienhoop et al. 2015). Additionally, it would be 
beneficial if the total compensation would cover both the lost income the enrolled 
land could have given if it would be in full production, as well as the opportunity 
costs (Lienhoop et al. 2015).  
According to Villanueva et al. (2017), preferences vary between farmers within 
the same cropping-systems in permanent olive groves in southern Spain. If farms 
within the same sub-system are affected differently by climate, their preference 
towards AES varies (Villanueva et al. 2017). An example from this is that farms who 
were located on mountain slopes were more positive towards AES than farms 
located in the valley, probably since farmland located in the mountains are more 
sensitive to environmental issues such as erosion (Villanueva et al. 2017). This 
origins in economical determinants since environmental damage such as erosions 
could affect the harvest negatively, causing a loss in production and thus also yield. 
It seems that AES uptake is higher in extensive farmland, compared to 
intensive farmland (Villanueva et al. 2017). One possible explanation for this is the 
risk of lost production and thus decreased profit from the yield within intensive 
farmland could be too high and inhibit the farmer from enrolling AES. It could also 
be connected to farmers’ perception, since it could possibly feel more complicated 
for farmers with intensive agricultural land to be suitable and “fit in” to an already 
outlined AES. 
Mandatory measures 
Pe’er et al. (2016) describe that economic considerations, including effects on 
productivity, are crucial parts for farmers when considering and choosing EFA. They 
also conclude that farmers tend to select EFAs that are the most productive and 
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cheapest, which goes in line with results from other studies, for example Villanueva 
et al. (2015a). Preferably, the EFA should as well be easy to implement, something 
that also was shown in that some Member States had a very large proportion of 
“easily implemented EFAs” chosen by farmers, such as cover crops and green cover 
(Pe’er et al. 2016). It was also shown that in areas with low land-rental prices and low 
productivity, farmers’ preferences towards EFA was more positive (Pe’er et al. 2016), 
something that could be complemented by to the results presented by Villanueva et 
al. (2015b). They showed that farmers who need to use special mechanical 
equipment to farm their land, e.g. for irrigation, find it harder to give up their land as 
EFA, possibly due to higher opportunity costs (Villanueva et al. 2015b). Concluding 
the economical determinants presented by Pe’er et al (2016), it is stated that farmers 
are unlikely to give up or have a negative approach towards the greening payments 
such as EFA, since the cost in terms of lost direct payments are higher than the 
implementation costs for the measures. However, this is not the conclusion in other 
studies on the subject. Villanueva et al. (2015a) showed that in a study on permanent 
crop land in southern Spain, done before the implementation of EFA was done in 
Member States, that farmers’ willingness to allocate parts of their land as EFA 
drastically decreases if the minimum area would go above 2-3% (Villanueva et al. 
2015a). However, when this was evaluated after the implementation farmers within 
the EU have allocated 10% of their arable land as EFA, which exceeds the current 
5% limit for the payments connected to EFA (Pe’er et al. 2016). This could be 
explained by EFAs having different weighing factors, where 1 ha of catch crops 
(weighing factor 0,3) only counts as 0,3 ha EFA, while 1 ha of fallow land (weighing 
factor 1) counts as 1 ha EFA (Pe’er et al. 2016). However, the suggestion of 
increasing the minimum EFA area from 5 % to 7 % (Regulation [EU] No 1307, 
2013), would thus not make a difference in farmer enrolment (Pe’er et al. 2016).  
Administrative restrictions 
Voluntary measures 
The current structure of AES implementation is managed from a top-down 
perspective, where farmers are free to choose from an already existing set of AES 
(Westerink et al. 2016). This has been proved to affect farmers’ willingness to 
participate in AES in a negative way (Siebert et al. 2006; Josefsson et al. 2017). 
Changing this perspective to a more bottom-up approach could benefit AES uptake 
in many ways, for example by creating schemes based on farmers’ abilities and 
knowledge (Westerink et al. 2016). This could not only simplify participation on a 
single-farm level, but also regarding collective AES (Westerink et al. 2016). A change 
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in the management and implementation of AES from a top-down perspective to a 
bottom-up perspective could also increase the collaboration between farmers, nature 
organisations and the government (Westerink et al. 2016). This could increase the 
farmers’ feeling of having control over their land (Westerink et al. 2016), something 
that is shown to be important for farmers when considering AES uptake (Josefsson 
et al. 2017; Pe’er et al. 2016).  
It is shown that farmers prefer shorter AES compared to longer participation in 
AES (Lienhoop et al. 2015; Kuhfuss et al. 2016), and that they want to return to their 
original farming practices after the scheme has ended (Lienhoop et al. 2015). The 
flexibility within the scheme has a great impact on farmer uptake (Villanueva et al. 
2015a; Kuhfuss et al. 2016). If the AES are perceived to be too constraining, the 
willingness amongst farmers to enrol the scheme decreases (Kuhfuss et al. 2016). 
Another factor effecting farmers’ willingness to enrol AES is the strict 
deadlines on when farmers can apply and enrol an AES, where less strict deadlines 
could increase farmers’ willingness to enrol AES (Lienhoop et al. 2015). 
Mandatory measures 
One factor that can strongly influence farmers’ preferences towards EFA are 
administrative restrictions (Pe’er et al. 2016). Since the implementation of EFA is 
continuously controlled by authorities, and the criteria are often strict, this could 
cause an increased fear amongst farmers of losing the payments. This could explain 
the low uptake of EFAs that have strict criteria, such as buffer strips and landscape 
features (Pe’er et al. 2016). Apart from choosing EFAs that have looser criteria, there 
is not much farmers can do to avoid these administrative restrictions, since allocating 
5% of the arable land is voluntary. It was also shown that if the farmer knows or feel 
that the future of the farm is secure, for example if the whole area is owned (and 
thus not rented) by just one farmer, the farmer would find it easier to accept EFA as 
parts of their land (Pe’er et al. 2016).  
Farmers’ perception and knowledge 
Voluntary measures 
According to Lienhoop et al. (2015), farmers are unwilling to enrol AES that they are 
unfamiliar with. Farmers’ general knowledge about AES greatly affects their 
consideration to enrol AES, where increased knowledge leads to an increased 
probability for farmers to join AES (Lienhoop et al. 2015). On the other hand, if the 
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scheme could increase the recreational access by the public, the probability of 
farmers to enrol the scheme decreases (Lienhoop et al. 2015). 
When farmers see themselves as “conservationists”, understanding that 
conservational management on their farmland greatly influences their production in 
a positive way, the willingness to enrol AES increases (Pe’er et al. 2016). Farmers 
may also choose to implement AES to follow a social norm, wishing to achieve or 
maintain a reputation in having a high productivity and conservational management 
amongst their neighbours (Pe’er et al. 2016). This is strengthened by results 
presented by Kuhfuss et al. (2016), where they explain that farmers often compare 
themselves in relation to others in their social group. Josefsson et al. (2017) also 
show results that could be compared to the self-perception as “conservationists”, 
where farmers who already have contact with environmental organisations are more 
positive towards enrolling AES. However, Franzén et al. (2016) found contrasting 
results, presenting that farms with an environmental approach (for example organic 
farms) did not have an increased willingness to enrol AES on wetland creation, 
compared to farmers with no or little environmental approach. 
There is a connection between advisory assistance and knowledge amongst 
farmers and their AES uptake (Villanueva et al. 2017; Lienhoop et al. 2015), as well 
as social learning (Westerink et al. 2016). Westerink et al. (2016) shows that 
continuous meetings and workshops increase the social learning, both between 
farmers and between farmers and government. When social learning increases, the 
understanding amongst farmers of the different roles farmers and the government 
has regarding AES design, which in turn could increase the AES uptake (Westerink 
et al. 2016).   
The farm size also affects the AES uptake, where farmers with large areas of 
arable land are less willing to enrol AES (Villanueva et al. 2017). However, Siebert et 
al. (2006) show the opposite, meaning that farmers with smaller areas of arable land 
are more willing to enrol AES. Contrary to what is presented by both Villanueva et 
al. (2017) and Siebert et al. (2006), Franzén et al. (2016) show that farm size does not 
at all affect the probability of farmers to enrol AES. Franzén et al. (2016) also 
showed that if the farmer own the land themselves, they are more likely to enrol 
AES.  
Farmers who have already been a part of an AES seem to be more positive 
towards enrolling a new AES than farmers who have never been a part of an AES 
(Villanueva et al. 2015b; Lienhoop et al. 2015; Kuhfuss et al. 2016). This could create 
a continuous positive effect, when more farmers enrol AES they are themselves 
more positive to enrol AES again, and they also affect the social norm in their 
neighbourhood (Kuhfuss et al. 2016). Similar to this, Josefsson et al. (2017) shows 
that farmers who already cooperate with environmental organisations are more 
willing to enrol other environmentally friendly measures, such as AES. However, 
there are also results from other studies where there is no significant positive effect 
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on AES uptake if the farmer has previously been enrolled in an AES (Howley et al. 
2014; Franzén et al. 2016). 
Mandatory measures 
Several factors have been shown to influence farmers’ preferences concerning EFA. 
One of these is farming intensity, where farmers on less intensive farms have a 
higher acceptance to set aside parts of their land as EFA than highly intensive farms 
(Villanueva et al. 2017). On the other hand, contrary to the same factor for AES, 
their results also showed that larger farms have a higher acceptance to devolve parts 
of their land as EFA, compared to smaller farms. This could be because larger farms 
easily can give up parts of their land that gives the lowest yield.  
It seems like the traditional land-use plays a role when farmers decide upon 
which EFA practices to choose (Pe’er et al. 2016). EFA practices such as hedges, 
which could be a part of the original farming landscape, could then be easily enrolled 
as EFA without any additional effort. Other attributes that could positively affect 
farmers’ decisions is the availability of new and necessary technologies and 
knowledge that could make the implementation of some EFAs easier (Pe’er et al. 
2016). Connected to this, farmers’ preferences towards EFA also vary with the 
climate in the region, which may affect the type of EFAs that are chosen, and thus 
also the impact on biodiversity (Pe’er et al. 2016). 
Also, described by Pe’er et al. (2016) is that farmers see themselves primarily as 
producers, whose main task is to ensure a steady production of crops and food for 
society, rather than conservationists. This could also explain why farmers value 
productivity higher than biodiversity in their decision-making. 
Villanueva et al. (2017) also showed that factors such as professional training in 
agricultural practices increases the acceptance regarding EFA for some farmer 
groups within the same study system of olive groves in southern Spain, which goes 
in line with other studies (for example Villanueva et al. 2015b). Villanueva et al. 
(2015b) also suggests that and at least secondary-school education or equivalent 
increase the probability of farmers to have a positive attitude towards EFA. It was 
also shown that if farmers are more affected by environmental change, such as farms 
located in steep slopes where soil erosion is more substantial, they seem to be more 
positive towards EFA than farmers located in areas where these environmental 
changes are not as noticeable within the same study system (Villanueva et al. 2017). 
Similarly, farmers who perceive themselves as “conservationists” are more positive 
to enrol into further environmentally friendly practices (Pe’er et al. 2016). Worth 
noting is that in the studies made by Villanueva et al. (2017) is done in permanent 
olive groves, and that preferences could differ between permanent crop land and 
arable land. This has also been discussed by Villanueva et a. (2015b). 
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Collective participation 
Voluntary measures 
The possibility of farm-takeover greatly affects the collective participation in AES 
amongst farmers (Villanueva et al. 2015b; Villanueva et al. 2017). If there is a high 
possibility of farm-takeover, the willingness to enrol collective AES decreases 
(Villanueva et al. 2015b; Villanueva et al. 2017). This may be true for example in 
family farms, where the current farmer wants to pass the farmland on to his or her 
successor in at least the same condition as it was when he or she started managing 
the farmland, thus not wanting to take of the any additional risks that may arise with 
collective implementation of AES (Siebert et al. 2006). This could not only be 
affecting farmers’ collective participation in AES, but also to be an economical 
determinant, since the risks of enrolling AES could lead to decreased productivity 
and income. Additionally, older farmers (over 60 years old) are more negative to 
collective AES than younger farmers, something that could be related to farm-
takeover (Villanueva et al. 2017). 
Farmers also express concerns about the environmental impacts when 
considering collective AES, questioning if it would create any benefits for the 
environment (Villanueva et al. 2015b). Another concern regarding collaborating 
participation regarding AES amongst farmers are the composition of the collective 
groups, and the fear of having other farmers interfering with their farmland 
management (Villanueva et al. 2015b). Related to the group composition, farmers 
express concerns for collective punishments in case one of the farmers in the group 
does not meet the requirements needed (Villanueva et al. 2015b). However, it is 
shown that if farmers have already been in some kind of agricultural cooperative, and 
thus have experience in collaborating with others, they are more positive to join 
collective AES (Villanueva et al. 2017). This could be due to farmers already knowing 
the benefits of collaboration, such as shared experiences, mutual learning and the 
possibility to buy expensive equipment together (Kuhfuss et al. 2016). 
There are connections between administrative restrictions and collective 
participation. A change in how collective AES are managed and implemented from a 
top-down approach to a bottom-up approach could increase the willingness for 
farmers to enrol collective AES (Westerink et al. 2016). This way farmers could 
develop and give suggestions on AES as a group, leading to a scheme designed for 
collective participation rather than for single farm participation (Westerink et al. 
2016). 
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Mandatory measures 
There are not many articles discussing the possibility of collective participation 
regarding EFA, as can be seen in table 3. However, there are some suggestions given 
by Pe’er et al. (2016), saying that collective participation regarding EFA between 
farmers could be advantageous. It could help farmers to reach up to ecological 
thresholds such as habitat size and connectivity (Pe’er et al. 2016; Pe’er et al. 2014). 
This may be beneficial for both biodiversity and farmers, since it would create more 
stable habitats for wildlife and biodiversity. 
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Discussion 
The aim for this study was to a) see how collaboration between farmers regarding 
EFA and AES could be increased, b) if the suggested approach differs between 
mandatory and voluntary environmental measures amongst farmers, and c) how 
could the policy design be developed and improved to facilitate for farmers to enrol 
and collaborate around environmental measures. When searching for literature for 
this study, the focus was to see how farmers’ preferences could differ between 
mandatory and voluntary environmental measures. However, when discussing policy 
design and implementation, it is important to bear in mind that a policy cannot be 
designed to only please farmers. Since farmers can choose which EFAs to 
implement, or which AES to enrol, they can choose measures that don’t have a 
positive effect on biodiversity (Pe’er et al. 2016). Therefore, it is important to design 
a policy that motivates farmers to choose measures with high environmental impact, 
since the main reason for the policy is to increase biodiversity.  
In this discussion, I will first present comparisons between the voluntary and 
mandatory measures, presented in different sections depending on if they derive 
from economical determinants, administrative restrictions, farmers’ perception and 
knowledge or collective participation. After that, I will explain the reasons for the 
study design, as well as the restrictions derived from that. 
Economical determinants 
Since the policy regulations for AES and EFA originate from different pillars in the 
CAP, and thus, differ in their specific requirements, there will be differences 
regarding farmers’ preferences towards the two. AES are voluntary to join, meaning 
that the compensating payments could only be obtained if the farmer voluntarily 
choses to enrol an AES. EFA, on the other hand, is mandatory, and the farmer 
needs to set aside 5 % of his or her arable land as EFA in order to obtain the direct 
payments from the EU. These differences have implications for policy design that 
increases the uptake of measures by farmers; When it comes to EFAs, farmers 
choose types that are easy and cheap to implement, preferably if they at the same 
time still can be used for crop production. However, according to the results brought 
together in my literature review, it seems like AES does not necessary need to be 
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easily implemented. Instead, for AES it seems to be more important that there are 
enough compensating payments that will cover both the opportunity costs, as well as 
the implementation and maintenance costs. 
When farmers choose EFAs based on how easy they are to implement, there is 
a risk for farmers choosing EFAs that have no or little positive impact on 
biodiversity (Pe’er et al. 2016). This is seen when farmers choose to have EFAs that 
contributes to farm production, such as nitrogen fixing crops, which have no or little 
impact on biodiversity (Pe’er et al. 2016). This is important to take into account 
when designing policies. In the case of the EFA, one way of mitigating this 
behaviour may be to only allow EFA types that are known to be beneficial for 
biodiversity (see e.g. Pe’er et al. 2016). 
Administrative restrictions 
There does not seem to be any clear pattern concerning farmers’ preferences for 
voluntary and mandatory measures regarding administrative restrictions. The results 
brought together in my literature review indicate that the administrative regulations 
regarding voluntary measures seem to be rather complex, concerning the whole 
process regarding AES design and implementation. Administrative regulations could 
affect farmers’ preferences towards AES in a negative way, since having the top-
down approach in governmental designing of AES could make farmers feel like they 
don’t have control over their farmland, and thus decrease the possibility of AES 
uptake amongst farmers (Westerink et al. 2016).  
However, there could be some similarities drawn between the two measures 
regarding flexibility. For AES, a high flexibility within the scheme increases farmers’ 
willingness to enrol the scheme. Thus a low flexibility (or strict criteria) could make 
farmers more concerned regarding the scheme, leading to the choice not to enrol. 
Similar to this, farmers are concerned about not fulfilling the strict criteria regarding 
EFAs, which may lead to them suffering from sanctions in terms of decreased 
payments. However, farmers can choose to not enrol AES, and thus avoid the strict 
criteria, while they have no choice to avoid the criteria for EFA other than choosing 
EFAs with less strict criteria, since it is mandatory. Thus, designing policies with 
incentives for farmers to choose EFAs with a high ecological value is of great 
importance. 
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Farmers’ perceptions and knowledge 
One thing that stood out regarding farmers’ perceptions and knowledge for both 
AES and EFA was farmers’ perception as being “conservationists” and 
understanding that conservational management on their farmland greatly influences 
their production in a positive way (Pe’er et al. 2016). This can affect which EFAs 
farmers choose (Pe’er et al. 2016). Based on this, it could be suggested that actions to 
increase farmers’ knowledge about how conservational management could be 
valuable in order to both increase AES uptake and create possibilities for farmers to 
choose EFAs that are more environmentally effective (Villanueva et al. 2015a). This 
is also connected to the fact that increased knowledge and training increase the 
willingness to adopt AES (Villanueva et al. 2015b; Villanueva 2017). For example, 
workshops and meetings between the government and groups of farmers increases 
the social learning, which may lead to an increased acceptance for environmental 
measures (Westerink et al. 2016). An overall increased knowledge about AES and its 
implementations could possibly reduce the unwillingness amongst to enrol AES that 
they are unfamiliar with (Lienhoop et al. 2015). 
Farm stability seems to affect AES uptake. Family-owned farms can create a 
sense of farm stability, having a clear future with a high possibility of farm-takeover. 
This seems to affect the uptake of AES negatively, since farmers do not want to 
hand over AES that the successor did not choose himself (Villanueva et al. 2017).  
Regarding farm size, this seems to affect farmers’ preferences towards AES and 
EFA differently. Regarding AES uptake, larger farms seem to have a more negative 
approach towards enrolling AES, compared to smaller farms (Villanueva et al. 2017). 
However, if this is true or not could be discussed since other results argue against 
this (Siebert et al. 2006; Franzén et al. 2016). Regarding preferences towards EFA, 
farmers on large farms seems to have a higher acceptance towards EFAs than 
farmers on smaller farms (Villanueva et al. 2017). It seems like it is easier for farmers 
with large areas of arable land to dispose their worst land as EFA, compared to 
farmers with smaller areas of arable land (Villanueva et al. 2017). However, when 
applying farm intensity, the preferences shift. Farmers on less intensive farms seems 
to have a higher acceptance towards dedicating parts of their land as EFA, compared 
to highly intensive farms (Villanueva et al. 2017).  
Collective participation 
Regarding collective participation in AES, the possibility of farm-takeover has a 
negative effect on farmers’ willingness to enrol collective AES (Villanueva et al. 
2015b; Villanueva et al. 2017). This is related to the risks farmers perceive they take if 
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they would implement a collective AES, and their desire to pass the farmland on to 
his or her successor in at least the same condition as it was when he or she started 
managing the farmland (Siebert et al. 2006).  
Farmers are questioning the environmental impact of collective AES 
(Villanueva et al. 2015), even though there are studies showing that the connectivity 
that could be given by collective AES could increase biodiversity and increase the 
probabilities of farmers to reach up to the ecological threshold (Pe’er et al. 2014; 
Pe’er et al. 2016). Promoting the sense of control amongst farmers over the 
environmental management on their farm could increase the acceptance towards 
collective AES (Josefsson et al. 2017). To handle the questioning amongst farmers 
regarding this, actions on increasing farmers’ knowledge about the benefits regarding 
collective AES could be needed (Josefsson et al. 2017).  
Incentives need to be created in order for farmers to see the advantages 
collective AES could give. One such incentive has been presented by Kuhfuss et al. 
(2016), meaning that a “collective bonus” could increase farmers’ willingness to enrol 
collective AES. They explain that if adding a collective bonus, the willingness of 
individual farmers to achieve the extra payment would lead to more farmers joining 
the collective AES, something that could increase the impact on biodiversity since a 
larger proportion of land is managed in an environmentally effective way (Kuhfuss et 
al. 2016). 
Study design and restrictions 
Instead of conducting a traditional literature review, where the risk of subconscious 
bias could be high (Roberts et al. 2006), the search process for this review had a 
systematic approach to minimize this. The method used was based on 
recommendations described by Haddaway et al. (2015) on how to do a traditional 
literature review more systematically approached when resources or time is scarce – 
as was the case in this study. The systematic approach mainly means that a) the 
literature search is done in a systematic and transparent way, allowing other 
researchers to repeat the procedure, and b) all articles from the searches are collected 
and rated according to their relevance for the subject. This results in a wider and less 
biased selection of articles than if relevant articles would be hand chosen from the 
beginning. However, using this approach in the very restricted timeframe may also 
have disadvantages. When minimizing bias through a restricted number of search 
phrases in a systematised literature review, there is a risk of important literature to 
not be included if it didn’t fit in with my search phrases. Since time has been scarce, 
the risk of not being able to critically analyse all articles would have been high if I 
expanded my search phrases, leading to a narrower search range.  
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The number of articles that discussed farmers’ preferences towards EFA was 
drastically lower than the number of articles that discussed farmers’ preferences 
towards AES (table 3). This is also shown by Villanueva et al. (2017), stating that 
literature regarding farmers’ preferences towards EFAs has not yet been published in 
a great extent. The same was shown for preferences towards collective participation 
in EFA, where only 1 article discussed this (table 3). However, this result is not too 
surprising since EFAs was implemented only recently after the latest CAP reform in 
2015 (Regulation [EU] No 1307, 2013).   
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Conclusion 
The questions aimed to be answered in this study are: a) Since collaboration between 
farmers regarding environmental measures could increase biodiversity, how could 
collaboration be increased? b) Should the suggested approach differ between 
mandatory and voluntary environmental measures amongst farmers? and c) 
Depending on where the obstacles for farmers are to enol in and collaborate around 
environmental measures, how could the policy design be developed and improved to 
facilitate for farmers to do so? 
Collaboration between farmers could be increased by reducing the uncertainty 
amongst farmers regarding the environmental benefits (but also farming benefits in 
terms of e.g. increased yield) of collective AES. By actively offering support and 
knowledge about the benefits regarding collective AES to farmers, such as the 
possibility of buying expensive equipment collectively, the overall perception 
towards AES, both regarding single schemes and collective schemes, could be 
increased. Economic incentives need to be considered as well, since economical 
compensation have been shown to have a great impact on farmers’ preferences and 
uptake of AES (Josefsson et al. 2017; Franzén et al. 2016; Villanueva et al. 2015b). 
Kuhfuss et al. (2016) gives good suggestion on economic incentives, presenting the 
possibility of including a collective bonus in the design of AES. However, more 
research on clear economic incentives regarding collective AES needs to be done. 
There are some differences in the approach towards voluntary and mandatory 
agri-environmental measures amongst farmers. There seems to be a connection 
between the flexibility and criteria of the different measures and farmers’ attitude 
towards them. A fear of not being able to fulfil the criteria, and thus losing payments 
or risking sanctions, decreases farmers’ preferences towards both AES and EFA. If 
AES and EFAs have flexible criteria, the fear of not reaching up to the criteria 
decreases and an increased enrolment and uptake could be possible. However, there 
could be a risk of losing the ecological aspects and the aim to increase biodiversity if 
the criteria would be less strict than they are today. 
The results brought together in my literature review showed that farmers want 
to go back to their original farming practices after the AES has ended (Lienhoop et 
al. 2015; Kuhfuss et al. 2016). Policy makers need to consider incentives that would 
increase the willingness to join another AES after the previous one has ended, or 
other ways motivating farmers to continue using environmentally friendly practices. 
However, more research is needed in this area, clarifying what is needed for farmers 
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to be willing to continue managing their farmland in an environmentally effective 
way. 
Regarding administrative constraints, there seem to be clear issues in the 
current top-down approach affecting farmers negatively when they consider 
enrolling collective AES. If Member States would change this approach to a more 
bottom-up based implementation process, there could be advantages to gain 
regarding AES uptake amongst farmers.  
Even if economical determinants have a great impact on farmers’ preferences 
towards AES (Josefsson et al. 2017; Franzén et al. 2016; Villanueva et al. 2015b), 
other determinants such as administrative restrictions and farmers’ perceptions and 
knowledge play a crucial role when explaining farmers’ preferences towards both 
AES and EFA. This means that when developing agri-environmental measures in the 
CAP in the future, policy makers must take a holistic approach, including both 
economic incentives, good administrative conditions for farmers to be willing to 
enrol collective AES. Additionally, regarding not only collective AES, but also EFA 
and individual uptake, policy makers as well as the Member States must create 
possibilities and motivations for farmers with different environmental prerequisites 
to be able to enrol AES and EFA with the same premises.  
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